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3OPINION
McKEE, Circuit Judge.
Joseph Kindler was sentenced to death after being
convicted of the first degree murder of David Bernstein.  After
unsuccessfully appealing in state court, Kindler filed this habeas
petition in district court alleging, inter alia,  that the trial court’s
jury instructions violated the Supreme Court’s pronouncement
in Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988), and that his trial
counsel had been ineffective during the penalty phase of his
trial.  The district court agreed that Kindler was entitled to relief
under Mills, and also concluded that he had established two
additional claims of prosecutorial misconduct.  The court
granted relief on those grounds while denying his remaining
claims.  The Commonwealth appealed, and Kindler filed a cross
appeal in which he challenged the district court’s denial of his
      The claims raised in the appeal and cross-appeal are so1
closely intertwined that we will address the various claims
issue by issue rather than discussing the appeal and cross
appeal separately.
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remaining claims for relief.   For the reasons that follow, we will1
affirm the district court’s grant of habeas relief based on the
Supreme Court’s decision in Mills. We will reverse the district
court’s denial of relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel
during the penalty phase of the trial.  Because we grant
Kindler’s relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel and
Mills claims, we decline to review his claims of prosecutorial
misconduct.
Ultimately, we conclude that Kindler is entitled to the
habeas relief that the district court ordered, and we will affirm.
I.  Factual and Procedural Background
    A. The Crime.
In 1982, Joseph Kindler, Scott Shaw, and David
5Bernstein burglarized a store in Lower Moreland Township,
Pennsylvania.  Police stopped their “getaway” car as they sped
from the scene, and took Shaw and Bernstein into custody.
Somehow, Kindler managed to escape.  However, under police
questioning, Bernstein identified Kindler as the driver of the
getaway car and the mastermind behind the burglary. Bernstein
also offered to testify against both Kindler and Shaw.  Armed
with this information, police obtained a warrant and arrested
Kindler.  The warrant identified Bernstein as the informant, and
Kindler subsquently learned that Bernstein had been granted
immunity so he could testify against Kindler.  
Following his arrest, and subsequent release on bail,
Kindler, along with Shaw and Shaw’s girlfriend, Michelle
Raifer, devised a plan to kill Bernstein in order to silence him.
Pursuant to that plan, Raifer lured Bernstein to the door of his
apartment in the early morning hours of July 25, 1982.  Kindler,
6who had been lying in wait, attacked Bernstein and struck him
over the head with a baseball bat approximately 20 times.
Acting on Kindler’s instructions, Shaw then jabbed Bernstein in
the ribs with an electric prod numerous times.  Kindler and
Shaw then dragged an immobilized Bernstein to Raifer’s
waiting car, leaving a 30-foot trail of blood behind.  The two
threw Bernstein into the trunk of the car and then drove to the
banks of the Delaware River where they took Bernstein from the
trunk and threw him into the river. Miraculously, Bernstein was
still alive when he was thrown into the river.  Upon realizing
that their blows had not killed Bernstein, Kindler and Shaw
managed to fill Bernstein’s lungs with water and then they tied
a cinder block around his neck to weigh him down.  
Kindler, Shaw, and Raifer then drove back to Kindler’s
home.  They discarded their weapons and other physical
evidence by throwing them down various sewer inlets along the
7way.  Despite those “precautions,” the plan began unraveling
almost immediately because police tracked down Raifer’s
blood-soaked car within a few hours of the crime. Bernstein’s
girlfriend and others had seen it during the course of the killing.
Raifer confessed after police confronted her with evidence that
tied her to the assault. In her confession, she implicated Kindler
and Shaw, and directed police to the various sewer inlets where
they had thrown the evidence.  To further complicate matters,
Bernstein’s body surfaced the next day.  During a subsequent
examination, police established that he died from drowning and
massive head injuries. 
B. The Trial and Kindle’s Post-Verdict Motions. 
Kindler and Shaw were jointly tried for Bernstein’s
murder in state court, and the jury convicted both of first-degree
murder and criminal conspiracy.  During the ensuing penalty
hearing, the jury found two aggravating circumstances
      Shaw received a sentence of life imprisonment.2
     In Pennsylvania, the death sentence is received and3
recorded by the court after the jury determines the sentence. 
The court formally imposes the sentence sometime later.  See
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(g).
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pertaining to Kindler; viz, he killed Bernstein to prevent him
from testifying, see 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(d)(5), and he
committed the  killing while perpetrating a felony - kidnapping.
See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(d)(6).  Although the
Commonwealth also argued that the “offense was committed by
means of torture,” 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(d)(8), the jury did
not find that aggravating circumstance. The jury found no
mitigating circumstances in favor of Kindler.  Thus, pursuant to
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(c)(1)(iv), Kindler was given the death
penalty.    After the penalty hearing, but before the sentence was2
formally imposed, Kindler filed post-verdict motions with the
assistance of new counsel.  3
9On September 19, 1984, while the post-verdict motions
were pending, Kindler escaped from a Philadelphia jail where he
was being held.  Following the escape, the Commonwealth
immediately moved to dismiss his post-verdict motions because
he was then a fugitive.  The trial court granted that motion
holding that Kindler had waived any right to have his post-
verdict motions considered by escaping. 
Kindler was eventually arrested on new criminal charges
as well as on immigration violations in Canada.  However, soon
after his arrest there, he once again managed to escape. This
time, he used bed sheets to create a makeshift rope to escape
from the thirteenth floor of the facility in Montreal where he was
being held.  He was captured once again in New Brunswick
Canada in 1988. 
Upon being returned to Philadelphia in 1991, Kindler
moved to reinstate his post-verdict motions; the trial court
10
denied the motion. 
C.  Kindler’s Direct Appeal and State Post-Conviction
Proceedings
On October 3, 1991, the trial court formally imposed
Kindler’s death sentence for the murder conviction, as well as
a consecutive term of 10 to 20 years imprisonment for the
kidnapping, and a concurrent term of five to 10 years for
criminal conspiracy.  Kindler appealed arguing that the trial
court should have addressed the merits of his post-verdict
motions upon his capture and return to Philadelphia. The
Superior Court rejected the argument and upheld his conviction
and sentence; the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed.   See
Commonwealth v. Kindler, 639 A.2d 1 (Pa. 1994).  The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that the trial court had
properly denied Kindler’s post-verdict motions without
considering the merits because of Kindler’s escape. Id. at 3
      At the time of Kindler’s direct appeal, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat.4
§ 9711(h), titled “Review of death sentence,” provided as
follows:
(1) A sentence of death shall be subject to
automatic review by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania pursuant to its rules. 
(2) In addition to its authority to correct errors at
trial, the Supreme Court shall either affirm the
sentence of death or vacate the sentence of
death and remand for further proceedings as
provided in paragraph (4). 
(3) The Supreme Court shall affirm the sentence
of death unless it determines that: 
(i) the sentence of death was the product of
passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor; 
11
(“[T]he action taken in dismissing the post-verdict motions was
a reasonable response to [Kindler]’s ‘flouting’ of the authority
of the court”).  The Court concluded that the escape resulted in
Kindler waiving all claims of error and preserving nothing for
appeal.  Nevertheless, given the death sentence, the court
reviewed the record as required by 42 Pa. Cons. Stat.
§ 9711(h)(3), and found no error.   The Court therefore affirmed4
(ii) the evidence fails to support the finding of at
least one aggravating circumstance specified in
subsection (d); or 
(iii) the sentence of death is excessive or
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in
similar cases, considering both the
circumstances of the crime 
and the character and record of the defendant. 
(4) If the Supreme Court determines that the
death penalty must be vacated because none of
the aggravating circumstances are supported by
sufficient evidence or because the sentence of
death is disproportionate to the penalty imposed
in similar cases, then it shall remand for the
imposition of a life imprisonment sentence. If
the Supreme Court determines that the death
penalty must be vacated for any other reason, it
shall remand for a new sentencing hearing
pursuant to subsections (a) through (g).
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the conviction and sentence.  On October 11, 1994, the United
States Supreme Court denied certiorari.
On January 11, 1996, Kindler filed a petition under
Pennsylvania’s Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) in which
he asked the court to adjudicate the merits of the claims he had
13
raised on direct appeal. The PCRA court denied the petition
without a hearing because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had
already ruled that Kindler’s escape resulted in a waiver of all
appellate claims he may otherwise have had.  The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court subsequently affirmed, agreeing that  Kindler
was ineligible for PCRA relief.  Commonwealth v. Kindler, 722
A.2d 143, 148 (Pa. 1998).   The Court also concluded that
Kindler’s claims had been previously litigated because he had
challenged the dismissal of his post-verdict motions on direct
appeal.  The Court explained: “[t]o grant [Kindler] the relief he
requests in his PCRA, an evidentiary hearing on claims already
forfeited by his flight from captivity, would render meaningless
all previous rulings of the trial court and of this Court.”  Id. at
148. The Court rejected Kindler’s argument that Pennsylvania’s
“relaxed waiver” doctrine permitted review of the merits of his
claim.  Although that doctrine allowed courts to look past a
14
procedural default and reach the merits of claims in a capital
case, the Court reasoned that the doctrine did not apply to
Kindler because it was “his own act of becoming a fugitive that
resulted in the forfeiture of the right to review of those claims.”
Id. at 148 n.13.  The Court denied reargument on March 15,
1999.
   D.  Kindler’s District Court Habeas Proceedings
On March 13, 2000, Kindler filed a counseled § 2254
habeas petition in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania which he subsequently
amended.  The amended petition raised eleven grounds for
relief.  See Kindler v. Horn, 291 F. Supp. 2d 323, 337-38 (E.D.
Pa. 2003) (summarizing the claims).  In opposing relief, the
Commonwealth claimed that the petition was untimely, and that
Pennsylvania’s fugitive waiver rule was an “independent and
adequate” state ground precluding federal habeas relief.  The
15
Commonwealth also argued that the claims were meritless. 
The district court applied statutory tolling and ruled that
Kindler’s petition was timely.  The court concluded that
Kindler’s petition for reargument before the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, had tolled the period of limitations.  The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had denied that petition on
March 15, 1999.  The district court held that Kindler had one
year from that date to file his habeas petition. Since he filed it on
March 13, 2000, the district court concluded that his petition
was timely. Kindler v. Horn, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 338-39.  
Next, the district court relied in part on Doctor v.
Walters, 96 F.3d 675 (3d Cir. 1996), in rejecting the
Commonwealth’s claim of  procedural default. There, we had
held that Pennsylvania’s fugitive forfeiture rule was not firmly
established when Kindler escaped. Accordingly, “the fugitive
forfeiture rule . . . [did] not provide an independent and adequate
16
basis to preclude federal review of [Kindler’s] habeas claims. .
.”. Kindler v. Horn, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 343. 
In addressing the merits of Kindler’s claim, the district
court rejected all of Kindler’s challenges to the guilt phase of his
trial. However, the court agreed with Kindler’s challenge to the
penalty phase, and concluded that the trial court’s jury
instruction was inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s
pronouncements in Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988).
The court also ruled that Kindler was entitled to relief because
of the prosecutor’s argument during the penalty phase. The court
concluded that the prosecutor had improperly introduced an
aggravating circumstance and had also “vouched for the death
penalty with respect to [Kindler] . . . in violation of his rights
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution.”  Kindler v. Horn, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 367.
The Commonwealth appealed the order granting a new
17
sentencing hearing (C.A. No. 03-9010), and Kindler appealed
the denial of relief on his other claims.   (C.A. No. 03-9011). 
The appeals were consolidated, and we granted a certificate of
appealability to Kindler allowing him to raise counsel’s
ineffectiveness at sentencing, and the district court’s failure to
instruct the jury that he was not eligible for parole if sentenced
to life imprisonment.  Kindler v. Horn, No. 03-9011 (order
entered Oct. 21, 2004).  
Before addressing the merits of either appeal, we must
determine the threshold  procedural issues, including whether
Kindler’s habeas petition was timely filed.  If Kindler’s claims
are timely and not defaulted, we must then determine whether
the district court erred in granting relief pursuant to Mills v.
Maryland.   In addition, we must determine whether the court
erred in denying relief on Kindred’s claim that the trial
erroneously failed to instruct the jury that he was ineligible for
18
parole, as well as Kindler’s claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel during the penalty phase of his trial.  As mentioned
above, we decilne to address Kindler’s prosecutorial misconduct
claims.
II.  Timeliness and Procedural Default
The Anti-Terrorism, and Effective Death Penalty Act
(“AEDPA”) creates a one-year period of limitations for state
prisoners to file federal habeas petitions. See  28 U.S.C. §
2244(d)(1).  The one year clock usually starts ticking when the
time for direct review expires. Typically, that is when the United
States Supreme Court denies certiorari or when the time for
seeking certiorari review expires. However, the limitation
period is tolled while “a properly filed application for State post-
conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent
judgment. . . is pending.”  28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).
Kindler and the Commonwealth agree that the limitation
      Kindler’s PCRA petition was pending as of April 24,5
1996, when AEDPA became effective, and remained pending
at least through December 11, 1998 when the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court denied Kindler’s state habeas petition. See 28
U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see also, Burns v. Morton, 134 F.3d 109,
111 (3d Cir.1998); Miller v. N.J. State Dep't of Corrs., 145
F.3d 616, 617 (3d Cir.1998) (holding that for convictions that
became final prior to AEDPA’s enactment, the AEDPA
limitations period begins on AEDPA’s effective date of April
23, 1996).   
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period here was tolled until at least December 11, 1998 when
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected his appeal of the
denial of PCRA relief.     As noted earlier, thereafter, Kindler5
filed for reargument of that December 11 ruling, and that
petition for reargument was not decided until March 15, 1999.
The parties disagree about whether the filing period was tolled
while his petition for reargument was pending before the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court.  If the period was not tolled by
filing the petition for reargument, Kindler’s one year limitation
period expired on December 10, 2000, and his March 13, 2000
     We reject the Commonwealth’s argument that the6
limitation period was not tolled from December 11, when the
the PCRA petition was denied to December 20  when theth
motion for reargument was filed because there was nothing
pending before a court during that time.  See Carey v. Saffold,
536 U.S. 214 (2002) (petitioner’s application would be
considered as pending during 4 ½ month time between denial
of lower court petition and filing of appeal of that decision so
long as the appeal was filed in accordance to state law.)
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federal habeas petition would therefore be untimely. Conversely,
if the AEDPA clock was tolled while that petition was pending,
the habeas petition was timely filed as detailed above.6
 Congress specifically provided that the one year period
for filing a federal habeas petition is tolled while “a properly
filed application for state post-conviction review or other
collateral proceeding is pending.”  28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).
AEDPA does not specifically define that phrase or explain what
it includes.  Nevertheless, we have held that an application for
relief that is permitted under state law and filed in accordance
with the state’s procedural requirements, tolls the filing period
21
under AEDPA.  Compare Lovasz v. Vaughn, 134 F.3d 146 (3d
Cir. 1998) (a prisoner’s second state habeas petition tolled the
AEDPA period of limitations because the state courts permitted
successive habeas petitions, and occasionally granted relief on
these petitions.); with Douglas v. Horn, 359 F.3d 257 (3d Cir.
2004) (a notice to appeal nunc pro tunc did not toll the
limitation period because Pennsylvania courts do not recognize
nunc pro tunc appeals as a permissible avenue for post-
conviction relief.).  
The Commonwealth does not dispute that Kindler
properly filed his motion for reargument within 14 days of the
denial of relief, as required by state law.  Rather, the
Commonwealth argues that motions for reargument are petitions
for “extraordinary relief,” and therefore not encompassed within
the meaning of “a properly filed petition” under AEDPA. The
Commonwealth rests this argument on its contention that such
22
petitions are “not favored” under Pennsylvania law.  According
to the Commonwealth such petitions are an exceptional form of
relief and Congress could therefore not have intended the
AEDPA clock to stop ticking while such a motion was pending.
However, we have found no Pennsylvania statute, case or
rule prohibiting motions for reargument and the Commonwealth
does not direct us to any. Indeed, Pennsylvania appellate
practice specifically provides for a motion for reargument, and
sets forth the time for filing such a motion.  See Pa.R.A.P. 2542
(setting forth a 14 day time limit for filing a motion for
reargument as well as other procedures for such motions); see
also Pa.R.A.P. 2543-2547.  Moreover, not surprisingly, capital
defendants in Pennsylvania routinely seek reargument when
their claims for relief are denied, and the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has granted such motions on more than one occasion.  See
Commonwealth v. Saranchak, 810 A.2d 1197 (Pa. 2002) (on
23
reargument, granting reinstatement of PCRA petition that had
been dismissed on appeal); Commonwealth v. Young, 748 A.2d
166 (Pa. 2000)(on reargument, granting relief on claim that was
denied in original decision); see also, Lovasz v Vaughn, 134
F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 1998) (considering the fact that the state
historically allowed a certain type of filing in determining that
such a filing tolls the AEDPA statute of limitations).
The Commonwealth nevertheless claims that Kindler’s
motion for reargument should not toll the limitation period here
because it was not necessary to exhaust state remedies.
According to the Commonwealth, only proceedings that are
required to exhaust a claim toll the limitation period under
AEDPA.  That argument is not rooted in the text of AEDPA or
any decision of this court of the Supreme Court. Rather, the
Commonwealth rests this argument upon the logic of
harmonizing AEDPA’s requirements for exhaustion and tolling.
24
The Commonwealth also argues that this interpretation of
AEDPA’s one year time limit prevents habeas petitioners from
tolling the limitation period indefinitely with a series of “exotic”
petitions for “extraordinary” relief. We disagree. 
Nothing in the text of AEDPA suggests that Congress
intended any such linkage.  To the contrary, that text undermines
the Commonwealth’s attempt to read exhaustion into the
statute’s tolling requirements.  Section 2244 conditions AEDPA
tolling only upon  properly filling an application for post-
conviction or collateral review.  Once properly filed, the time
during which the petition is pending is explicitly tolled under §
2244.  Congress could easily have declared that the limitations
period would only be tolled while any petition required to
exhaust claims is pending in state court. It did not do so, and we
can not amend the statute by adopting the Commonwealth’s
attempt to forge a nonexistent link between exhaustion and
     Indeed, it is ironic given considerations of deference and7
comity so frequently relied upon in arguing against federal
relief that the state would now ask us to ignore a procedure
provided under state procedural law and utilized by the state’s
highest court.
25
statutory tolling.7
Moreover, we rejected a similar argument in Sweger v.
Chesney, 294 F.3d 506 (3d Cir. 2002).  There, we concluded
that the plain text of 28 U.S.C. § 2244 undermines any policy
justification for linking AEDPA’s tolling requirements with its
exhaustion requirements. Specifically, we had to determine 
whether this tolling provision applies on a claim-
by-claim basis, requiring at least one or more of
the issues raised in the state collateral proceeding
to be included in the federal habeas petition, or
whether a state post-conviction proceeding
attacking a judgment of conviction tolls the period
of limitations for the entire habeas petition
attacking that same judgment.
294 F.2d at 513.
 We held that Congress did not intend AEDPA’s tolling
26
provision to be applied on a case by case basis.  We noted that
our decision would have been the same even if we factored
policy considerations into our analysis because separate rules for
tolling and exhaustion advance, rather than retard, the goals of
federalism and comity enshrined in AEDPA.  Id. at 519-520 (“
the statute of limitations . . . and the exhaustion doctrine . . .
impose entirely distinct requirements on habeas petitioners;
[although] both must be satisfied before a federal court may
consider the merits of a petition.”).  Maintaining the distinction
encourages habeas petitioners to utilize all avenues for review
authorized under state law before seeking habeas relief in
federal court.  Id.  
Moreover, we are simply not impressed by the
Commonwealth’s concern that habeas petitioners may endlessly
extend AEDPA’s one year filing deadline by resorting to exotic
or “extraordinary” state petitions.   That theoretical concern, not
27
exemplified here, does not justify the forced reading of AEDPA
required by the Commonwealth’s position.  
B. Procedural Default
As noted above, the Pennsylvania courts applied
Pennsylvania’s fugitive forfeiture rule and concluded that
Kindler waived his right to seek appellate review.  They thus
dismissed his appeals without reaching the merits of any of his
claims.   As a matter of comity and federalism, a federal court
cannot rule on the merits of a habeas petitioner’s claims when
a state court has found such claims to be procedurally defaulted
pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule
unless the petitioner shows cause and prejudice for the default.
  See Doctor v. Walters, 96 F.3d 675, 683 (3d Cir. 1996). The
district court reasoned that, in this case, Pennsylvania’s fugitive
forfeiture doctrine did not preclude review of the merits of
Kindler’s claims.   We agree.
28
A state procedural rule precludes federal habeas review
only if it is “firmly established” and “consistently and regularly
applied” by the state’s courts. See Johnson v. Mississippi, 486
U.S. 578, 587 (1988); see also Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411,
423-24 (1991) (state procedural rule must be “firmly established
and regularly followed” to bar federal habeas review).  In
addition, the state rule must speak in unmistakable terms, and
the state courts’ refusal to review a petitioner’s claim must be
consistent with decisions in similar cases.  See Doctor v.
Walters, 96 F.3d at 683-684; Neely v. Zimmerman, 858 F.2d
144, 148 (3d Cir.1988).  A procedural rule that is consistently
applied in the vast majority of cases is adequate to bar federal
habeas review even if state courts are willing to occasionally
overlook it and review the merits of a claim for relief where the
rule would otherwise apply.  Id.  Furthermore, the adequacy of
the rule is determined by the law in effect at the time of the
29
asserted waiver, not when the petitioner subsequently seeks
review in federal court.  See Doctor, 96 F.3d at 684.
Despite the Commonwealth’s efforts to distinguish this
case, our analysis of Kindler’s procedural default is controlled
by our analysis in Doctor.  There, we held that Pennsylvania’s
fugitive forfeiture rule did not bar federal habeas review as
applied to Doctor, a habeas petitioner who had, like Kindler,
escaped.  Doctor escaped in 1986 during a lunch recess of his
criminal trial, but the trial resumed after the recess and he was
convicted in absentia.  Id. at 678.  Five years later, after he was
captured and sentenced, he appealed.  The Pennsylvania courts
applied the fugitive forfeiture rule and refused to consider the
merits of his appeal.  Id.  On federal habeas review, the
Commonwealth argued that the state courts’ application of the
fugitive waiver doctrine precluded federal habeas relief. We
disagreed  because the rule was not being consistently or strictly
30
applied when Doctor escaped in 1986.  Id. at 684-686.  After
surveying decisions of Pennsylvania courts we concluded that
Pennsylvania courts had discretion to hear an appeal filed by a
fugitive who had been returned to custody before an appeal was
initiated or dismissed.  Id. at 686.  Accordingly, the fugitive
forfeiture rule was not “firmly established” and therefore was
not an independent and adequate procedural rule sufficient to
bar review of the merits of a habeas petitioner in federal court.
Here, Kindler escaped from custody in 1984 while his
post-verdict motions were pending.  Kindler, like Doctor, was
returned to custody before any direct appeal of his conviction or
sentence was initiated.  The Commonwealth seeks to distinguish
Doctor  because Kindler’s escape resulted in the dismissal of
post-verdict motions that were pending when he escaped. The
Commonwealth contends that the dismissed post-verdict
motions were analogous to a dismissed appeal.  Therefore,
31
argues the Commonwealth, the state appellate courts had no
more discretion to re-instate Kindler’s post-verdict motions than
they had to reinstate a dismissed appeal.  Despite its facial
appeal, we cannot agree with this interpretation of Doctor. 
In Commonwealth v. Galloway, 333 A.2d 741 (Pa. 1975),
as discussed in Doctor, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
re-instated supplemental post-verdict motions that had been
dismissed pursuant to the fugitive forfeiture rule.  The court did
so because once the defendant was apprehended, he was
returned to the jurisdiction of the court, and would therefore be
responsible for, and subject to, the court’s judgment.   Galloway
thus underscores a critical distinction between dismissed
post-verdict motions and a dismissed final appeal.  That
distinction arises from the fact that after an appeal is dismissed,
a court no longer retains jurisdiction.  However, appellate courts
can exercise jurisdiction after post-verdict motions are
32
dismissed, and they therefore can exercise discretion to hear the
claims of defendant’s appeal.  Thus, Galloway fatally undercuts
the Commonwealth's attempt to distinguish Kindler’s situation
from Doctor’s based upon differences in the procedural posture
at the time of their respective escapes. When Kindler escaped in
1984, Galloway had not been overruled.  Accordingly, the state
trial court still had discretion to reinstate his post-verdict
motions.  Accordingly, we conclude that, under Doctor,
Pennsylvania’s fugitive waiver law did not preclude the district
court from reviewing the merits of the claims raised in Kindler’s
habeas petition.
III.  Kindler’s Claims. 
We review the district court’s resolution of Kindler’s
claims de novo.  See Duncan v. Morton, 256 F.3d 189, 196 (3d
Cir. 2001).  We do not apply the deferential standard of review
otherwise applicable under AEDPA because Kindler’s claims
33
have never been “adjudicated on the merits” in state courts.  See
Bronshtein v. Horn, 404 F.3d 700, 710 (3d Cir. 2005).
     A.  Mills v. Maryland 
Kindler contends that his sentence was imposed in
violation of the Eighth Amendment, as construed in Mills v.
Maryland and Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990).  More
specifically, Kindler contends that the jury instructions and
verdict slip created a reasonable likelihood that the jury believed
it could only consider mitigating circumstances that jurors
unanimously agreed upon.  The district court agreed and granted
a conditional writ requiring the Commonwealth to either
conduct a new sentencing hearing or cause Kindler to be
sentenced to life imprisonment. 
In Mills v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that the
Constitution prohibits a state from requiring jurors to
unanimously agree upon the existence of a particular mitigating
34
circumstance before weighing that circumstance against any
aggravating circumstances  during the penalty phase of a capital
trial.  The Court illustrated with a “disturbing scenario” wherein
eleven jurors agreed upon a mitigating circumstance but
concluded that they could not consider it because a 12  jurorth
disagreed that it exists.  Mills, 486 U.S. at 373.  That single
juror’s view of the facts would result in the death penalty being
imposed despite the will of the overwhelming majority of the
jurors. Equally disturbing to the Court was the possibility that all
twelve jurors would each find a mitigating circumstance, but not
be able to agree on the existence of any one “mitigator.”  Such
a jury would also recommend a sentence of death because it
would erroneously conclude that there was nothing to weigh
against the aggravating circumstances that may exist.  Id.  The
Court thus concluded that the Eighth Amendment requires that
jurors be allowed to consider any and all mitigating
     Kindler’s counsel objected to this charge on the record. 8
Joint Appendix (“JA”), 204-205.
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circumstances without the requirement of unanimity.  Id. at 384.
Accordingly, a death sentence must be vacated if there is a
substantial probability that the jury charge caused a reasonable
juror to believe that mitigating circumstances can not be
considered  unless all jurors agree on the existence of the
mitigating circumstance.  Id.
The Supreme Court later clarified Mills in Boyde v.
California.  In Boyde, the Court explained that the inquiry under
Mills was whether “there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury
has applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the
consideration” of relevant mitigating circumstances that the
defendant proffered. 
Here, the court’s instruction at the beginning of the
penalty phase included the following explanation:  8
     The second time that the judge read the instructions, he9
removed the words “in that list” and added a filler phrase;
“which you have seen,” so that the instructions read:  
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Now, the aggravating circumstances must be
proved by the Commonwealth beyond a
reasonable doubt.  Mitigating circumstances must
be proved by the defendant by a preponderance of
the evidence.  A preponderance of the evidence is
somewhat less proof than is required for
reasonable doubt.
Now, the verdict must be a sentence of death if
the jury unanimously finds at least one
aggravating circumstance specified in that list,
subsection “D” and no mitigating circumstances
or if the jury unanimously finds one or more
aggravating circumstances which outweigh any
mitigating circumstances.
The verdict must be a sentence of life
imprisonment in all other cases.  The court may in
its discretion discharge the jury if it is of the
opinion that further deliberation will not result in
a unanimous agreement as to the sentence, in
which case the court shall sentence the defendant
to life imprisonment.  The court shall instruct the
jury on any other matters that may be just and
proper under the circumstances . . . . 
JA 73-74 & 196-97.   9
Now, the verdict must be a sentence of death if the jury
unanimously finds at least one aggravating
circumstance specified subsection “D,” which you
have seen and no mitigating circumstances or if the
jury unanimously finds one or more aggravating
circumstances which outweigh any mitigating
circumstances.
JA 197.  
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Moreover, the verdict slip read:
We, the jury empaneled in the above entitled case,
having heretofore determined that the defendant is guilty
of murder in the first degree, do hereby find:
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE(S)
The victim was a fireman, peace officer, or
public servant concerned in official
detention who was killed in the
performance of his duties ()
The defendant paid or was paid by another
person or had contracted to pay or be paid
by another person or has conspired to pay
or be paid by another person for the killing
of the victim ( )
The victim was being held by the
defendant for ransom or reward, or as a
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shield or hostage ( )
The death of the victim occurred while
defendant was engaged in the hijacking of
an aircraft ( )
The victim was a prosecution witness to a
murder or other felony committed by the
defendant and was killed for the purpose
of preventing his testimony against the
defendant in any grand jury or criminal
proceeding involving such offenses ( )
The defendant committed a killing while
in the perpetration of a felony ( )
In the commission of the offense the
defendant knowingly created a grave risk
Of death to another person in 
addition to the victim of the offense
( )
The offense was committed by
means of torture ( )
The defendant has a significant
history of felony convictions
involving the use or threat of
violence to the person ( )
The defendant has been convicted
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of another Federal or State offense,
committed either before or at the
time of the offense at issue for
which a  sen tence of  life
imprisonment or death was
imposable or the defendant was
undergoing a sentence of life
imprisonment for any reason at the
time of the commission of the
offense ( )
M I T I G A T I N G
CIRCUMSTANCE(S)
The defendant has no significant
h i s to ry o f  p r io r  c r im in a l
convictions ( )
The defendant was under the
influence of extreme mental or
emotional disturbance ( )
The capacity of the defendant to
appreciate the criminality of his
conduct or to conform his conduct
to the requirements of law was
substantially impaired ( )
The age of the defendant at the time
of the crime ( )
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The defendant acted under extreme
duress, although not such duress as
to constitute a defense to
prosecution under Section 309
(relating to duress), or acted under
the substantial domination of
another person ( )
The victim was a participant in the
defendant's homicidal conduct or
consented to the homicidal acts ( )
The defendant's participation in the
homicidal act was relatively minor
( )
Any other evidence of mitigation
concerning the character and record
of the defendant and  the
circumstances of his offense ( )
The aggravating circumstance(s)
o u t w e i g h  t h e  m i t i g a t i n g
circumstance(s) YES ( ) NO ( )
We the jury render the following
sentencing verdict: 
DEATH ( )
LIFE IMPRISONMENT ( )
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JA 213-15.  
In addition, the following exchange occurred between the
court and the jury foreperson when the jury returned to ask a
question during deliberations:
JURY FOREPERSON:   Do we have to apply any
checkmarks besides the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances on the final sheet?
What I’m saying, is that there’s a poll taken and
say were using all 10 questions, you know, just
for example, and there’s quite a possibility that all
12 people would pick all 10.  Do you want a
checkmark or do you want a number beside
those?
THE COURT:   I’ll just read the instructions from
the law and then I’ll answer your question.  The
verdict must be a sentence of death if the jury
unanimously finds at least one aggravating
circumstance that’s specified in subsection D and
no mitigating circumstances or if the jury
unanimously finds one or more aggravating
circumstances which outweigh any mitigating
circumstances.  The verdict must be a sentence of
life imprisonment in all other cases.  
In other words, the only ones that you would mark
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off and report would be [the ones] that all of you
had agreed upon.  Are there any further
questions?
JURY FOREPERSON: You don’t want a number
there; you just want a checkmark.
THE COURT:  A checkmark.   
JA 198-200. 
The judge’s answers thus exacerbated the Mills problem
that already infected the jury’s deliberations based upon the
misleading and ambiguous wording of the jury charge.  That
charge clearly created a reasonable likelihood that the jurors
may have believed that they could only consider the mitigating
circumstances that they unanimously agreed upon.  The
language quoted above instructed the jury that: “the verdict must
be a sentence of death if the jury unanimously finds at least one
aggravating circumstance . . . and no mitigating circumstances
or if the jury unanimously finds one or more aggravating
      In Abu-Jamal, we rejected the Commonwealth’s10
contention that our decision upholding the charge in
Zettlemoyer v. Fulcomer, 923 F.2d 284 (3d Cir.1991)
precluded a Mills violation in that case.  See Zettlemoyer, 923
F.3d at 308 (upholding charge instructing the jury to impose
death if they unanimously agree and find that the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances.). 
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circumstances which outweigh any mitigating circumstances.”
Thus, “unanimous” modifies “finds” and creates a reasonable
likelihood that the jurors erroneously believed that mitigating
and aggravating circumstances both had to be unanimously
agreed upon.  Nowhere were the jurors told that they only had
to unanimously agree on aggravating circumstances and not
mitigating circumstances, or that the requirement of unanimity
did not apply to any mitigating circumstance that any juror may
have found by a preponderance of the evidence.  
This conclusion is consistent with our recent holding in
Abu-Jamal v. Horn, 520 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 2008), as well as
other cases where similar instructions were given.  See Albrecht10
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v Horn, 471 F.3d 435 (finding a Mills violation, but vacating the
district court's order granting habeas relief after applying Teague
v. Lane); Banks v Horn, 271 F.3d 527 (3d Cir. 2001), rev'd on
other grounds by Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406 (2004); Frey v.
Fulcomer, 132 F.3d 916, 923-24 (3d Cir.1997). 
In addition, as we have just explained, the confusion was
amplified by the court’s exchange with the jury foreperson when
the jury returned to ask a question during deliberations. 
Finally, the error was further exacerbated by the wording
of the verdict slip. Unlike Hackett v. Price, 381 F.3d 281 (3d.
Cir. 2004), where the verdict slip established that the jury agreed
that there were no mitigating circumstances, the verdict slip here
offered no direction regarding how findings were to be made.
Moreover, no boxes were checked.  This may mean that no juror
found any mitigating circumstance as the Commonwealth
argues.  However, it is equally likely that jurors could not
      Although our conclusion that the district court did not11
err in granting relief under Mills is itself sufficient to affirm
the conditional writ that the district court granted and decide
Kindler’s appeal, we think it important to also discuss
Kindler’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the
penalty phase because of the importance of the issue to our
jurisprudence, the gravity of the consequence of the alleged
deficiency, and the need to provide guidance in future cases.
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unanimously agree on any particular mitigating circumstance
even though one or more juror was convinced a mitigating
circumstance had been established, and that the jury assumed
that the mitigating circumstance could not be weighed because
of the lack of unanimity.  Accordingly, the district court
properly granted relief under Mills.
B.  Ineffective Assistance of Counsel11
Kindler also contends that his attorney’s performance
during the penalty phase deprived him of effective assistance of
counsel under the Sixth Amendment because his attorney failed
to investigate his social and family history or his mental health
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history.  
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are governed by
the familiar two-prong inquiry set forth in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), requiring a petitioner to
show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the
deficiency prejudiced him.  The first prong is established by
demonstrating that counsel’s performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness.  Id.  The reasonableness
of counsel’s performance is assessed on the facts of the
particular case at the time of the challenged conduct or
omission.  Id. at 689.  The prejudice inquiry requires a showing
that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
Id. at 694.  A “reasonable probability is a probability sufficient
to undermine confidence in the outcome.”  Id.
Kindler submitted an affidavit from Daniel-Paul Alva, his
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trial counsel, in support of his Strickland claim.  That affidavit
includes the following declaration:
Mr. Kindler’s case was my first capital trial.  I did
not have any experience or training in how to
handle capital cases, in particular the penalty
phase of the proceeding.
I concentrated my efforts on attempting to create
a reasonable doubt as to Mr. Kindler’s guilt,
although I was aware that there was a strong
likelihood that Mr. Kindler would be convicted.
I did not conduct a penalty phase or mitigation
investigation.  In particular, I did not talk to Mr. Kindler
or any of his family members about his family
background.  Mr. Kindler’s family was available to me.
His parents had retained me, and they attended the trial.
I simply did not think about investigating or presenting
evidence concerning family background at the penalty
phase.  
I also did not attempt to obtain any school, medical or
other records relating to Mr. Kindler.  I did not have a
strategic or tactical reason for not seeking such records;
it just did not occur to me that such records could be
helpful.  
I also did not consider obtaining any mental health
evaluation of Mr. Kindler.  Again, there was no strategic
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or tactical reason for my failure to do so.      
S.A. 25.    
Kindler also submitted declarations from his parents, his
sister, a friend, a psychologist and a psychiatrist detailing
information that Kindler claims would have been uncovered by
an adequate investigation.  Kindler’s parents and sister detailed
Kindler’s upbringing.  Kindler’s parents fought frequently and
violently.  In these fights, his parents threw household items,
dishes, shoes, and furniture at each other.   Kindler personally
witnessed these fights, and they left him terrified and crying.
Kindler’s mother was violent, depressed, and often intoxicated.
She attempted suicide on several occasions.   Kindler’s father
was so controlling that he even restricted the amount of water,
electricity, and other resources available to Kindler and his
sister.  After Kindler’s mother separated from his father,
Kindler’s father threatened to kill her and the children.  Supp.
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App. 7.  Kindler’s sister described the situation as “living with
two crazy people that could not control themselves.”  Supp.
App. 12.
The declarations also state that both of Kindler’s parents
abused him.  His mother was verbally abusive.  Id.  She also
threw food at Kindler, and once dumped soup on his head when
he wouldn’t eat.  Kindler’s father physically abused him with
electrical cords.   These beatings would leave him with welts on
his back, and blood showing through his shirt.  After his mother
and father separated, Kindler lived with his father, and they
fought frequently.  Their relationship deteriorated to the point
where Kindler’s sister described an instance where Kindler and
his father threw bricks at each other during a fight.  
Kindler’s friend described a motorcycle accident Kindler was
involved in when Kindler was a “preteen.”  Supp. App. 16.  The
motorcycle Kindler was riding on was hit by a car causing
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Kindler to lose consciousness for a few minutes.  After
regaining consciousness, Kindler was dazed and confused, and
could not remember the accident.    His speech was also
incomprehensible.  Despite those symptoms,  Kindler was not
taken to a hospital or given medical treatment. 
Perhaps most importantly, in her affidavit, psychologist,
Carol Armstrong, Ph.D., declared that Kindler suffered from
frontal lobe impairment that can affect judgment, and the ability
to control impulsive behavior.  The frontal lobe impairment is
consistent with Kindler’s history of head injuries, and physical
and emotional abuse.  She also attested to the cognitive,
developmental, and emotional effects that the neglect, abuse,
and violence that surrounded Kindler could have had upon him.
Armstrong additionally noted that the tests she performed could
have been performed and would have resulted in the same
conclusions at the time of Kindler's penalty phase proceedings.
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As if this were not sufficiently derelict, psychiatrist,
Robert A. Fox, declared that he also evaluated Kindler and
reviewed various records.  Fox diagnosed Kindler as suffering
from “mood disorder due to a general medical condition with
mixed features” and “narcissistic personality disorder” at the
time of the crimes.  Supp. App. 23.  He stated that the mood
disorder caused periods of hypomanic symptoms interspersed
with periods of depression and significant distress and
impairment in Kindler's life.  According to Dr. Fox, similar
distress resulted from the narcissistic personality disorder, which
is characterized by grandiosity, a need for admiration, and a lack
of empathy.  Fox concluded that these two disorders, in
combination with the history of physical and emotional trauma,
were impairments that constituted an extreme mental or
emotional disturbance. 
The district court concluded that Alva’s performance did
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not violate Kindler’s Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel.  The court reasoned that although Alva’s
failure to investigate Kinder’s personal and psychological
history constituted deficient performance under the first
Strickland prong, that failure did not prejudice Kindler, and he
therefore could not prevail under the second prong.  The district
court believed that this evidence could have been viewed as a
mitigating circumstance, but the court did “not believe that the
jury could have determined that this mitigating factor adequately
outweighed the two aggravating factors found.”  Id.    
Both parties assert that the district court erred.  The
Commonwealth argues that the court erred in ruling that Alva’s
performance was deficient; Kindler argues that the district court
erred by holding that the deficient performance did not result in
prejudice.
It is difficult to understand how the Commonwealth can
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sincerely argue that the kind of information set forth above
could not have been viewed as a mitigating circumstance by the
jury or how Alva’s failure to investigate it could be viewed as
anything other than deficient representation.  Defense counsel
in capital cases has a duty to reasonably investigate the existence
of mitigating evidence unless reasonable strategic judgments
support a decision not to.  See Strickland, 446 U.S. at 691.
Here, Alva admits that his failure to investigate Kindler’s history
was not the result of any strategic or tactical decision.  Supp.
App. 25.  Rather, it resulted solely from his lack of experience
in capital cases, and the fact that it never occurred to him to
investigate Kinder’s history.  Id.  Although the Commonwealth
insists that Alva is “falling on his sword” for a former client,
nothing on this record contradicts the veracity of his sworn
affidavit, and the district court did not rest its decision on any
doubt about the veracity of Alva’s sworn declarations.
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The Commonwealth also argues that Kindler’s Strickland
claim is belied by the quality of the mitigation case that Alva
presented during the penalty phase of Kindler’s trial. The
Commonwealth points to the five witnesses that Alva called on
Kindler’s behalf and the testimony he elicited regarding
Kindler’s usefulness to society.  The Commonwealth also points
to Alva’s impassioned final argument asking the jury to spare
Kindler’s life.   This misses the point.  We do not suggest that
Alva’s performance was deficient because he inadequately
presented the limited information that he had.  Rather, Alva’s
performance was deficient because his failure to adequately
investigate mitigation evidence of mitigation materially limited
what evidence he could present to the jury.  Indeed, the skillful
manner in which Alva presented the limited evidence that he did
have illustrates the potential force of the mitigation evidence
that he did not have because he so limited the scope of his
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mitigation investigation.
Alva, a very skillful and forceful advocate, only
presented testimony that Kindler was skilled in electronics, and
could be productive in prison.  That mitigation pales in
comparison to the mitigating circumstances that a proper
investigation of Kindler’s background would have developed.
In finding that Alva’s performance did not prejudice Kindler,
the district court considered only the evidence proffered by the
two experts relating to Kindler’s frontal lobe impairment and his
personality and mood disorders.  Kindler v. Horn, 291 F.Supp.
2d at 356.  The court found that the mitigating circumstance of
Kindler’s emotional disturbance would have been established by
the experts, but (in what it termed “a close call”) the court held
that the evidence was ‘insufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome of the sentencing verdict.”  Id.  We disagree; this
evidence, in conjunction with proposed testimony regarding
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Kindler’'s chaotic and violent childhood with "two crazy people"
for parents who constantly abused him (and each other in his
presence), is sufficient to meet the second prong of the
Strickland inquiry.  See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005)
(defendant was victim of physical abuse and neglect from
alcoholic parents); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003)
(defendant suffered extreme parental neglect, severely abused by
his mother, and sexually abused as a child) ; Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362 (2000) (defendant was severely neglected as a
child); Outten v. Kearney, 464 F.3d 401 (3d Cir. 2006)
(defendant was physically abused by father, and sexually abused
by others).
Kindler’s jury could easily have considered evidence of
his chaotic and abusive childhood as “evidence of mitigation
concerning the character and record of the defendant and the
circumstances of his offense.”  42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(e)(8).
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We can not say with confidence that the penalty phase would
have had the same result if the jurors had been able to weigh the
two aggravating circumstances that were established beyond a
reasonable doubt against the evidence of mitigation that a proper
investigation would have presented.  The evidence might well
have been accepted as explaining (though certainly not
excusing) Kindler’s impulsive actions including why he was so
willing to kill and brutalize Bernstein. 
Accordingly, we find that Kindler is also entitled to a
new penalty hearing because his counsel’s deficient
performance during the penalty phase deprived him of the
effective assistance of counsel that the Sixth Amendment
requires. 
C.  Vouching
Kindler claimed that the prosecutor’s argument during
the penalty phase violated his constitutional rights by improperly
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vouching for the death penalty.   He challenged the following
part of the prosecutor’s statement: 
Let me at this point, ladies and gentlemen,
tell you the position, the position of the
office, the position of the Commonwealth.
We in this case seek and urge through the
evidence and the law the death penalty
against Joseph Kindler. 
In reference to Scott Shaw, I will argue
and present both of the sides and it is up to
you to decide against both of these
particular individuals what penalty you
feel appropriate. That would be the case no
matter what our office’s position is but I
felt from the outset here that I would let
you know that the urging would be done
based on the evidence would be against
Mister Kindler. 
That does not mean that you cannot or
would not, based on the evidence and the
law return such a penalty if you felt
appropriate, against Mister Scott Shaw.
That is your power and if you find it your
duty in connection with what the law is,
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then I am sure you would do it but I, at
least, wanted to let you know that now.
Kindler argued that this was tantamount to improperly
vouching for a sentence of death for him because the prosecutor
improperly informed the jury that the official position of the
District Attorney’s Office was that he should be put to death, but
the District Attorney did not care about whether his co-
defendant should be executed.  The district court agreed, and the
Commonwealth appeals that ruling.  
The district court reasoned: 
In considering [the prosecutor’s
argument], we find it clearly
constituted improper vouching and
harmful, constitutional error.
Indeed, the entire premise of the
prosecutor’s argument was that the
Commonwealth possessed even
stronger evidence of Joseph
Kindler’s guilt and statutory
aggravators than that presented to
the jury and that ‘was why the
urging would be done based on the
      We do not suggest that a defendant can never establish12
improper prosecutorial vouching if the challenged statement
does not rigidly adhere to these criteria as there may be
situations where the prosecutor’s argument so strongly
invokes the authority of his/her office and so blatantly crosses
the line of propriety that it is tantamount to unconstitutional
vouching.   See United States v. Johnson, 968 F.2d 768 (8th
Cir. 1992).  However, no such circumstance is present here,
and our analysis therefore proceeds along the familiar two
prong inquiry discussed in Walker.
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evidence... against Mister Kindler.’
We disagree. “Our case law indicates that to find
vouching, two criteria must be met: (1) the prosecutor must
assure the jury that the testimony of a Government witness is
credible; and (2) this assurance is based on either the
prosecutor's personal knowledge, or other information not
contained in the record.” United States v. Walker, 155 F.3d 180,
187 (3d Cir.1998).  The prosecutor’s statements here do not
meet either requirement.  The prosecutor did not draw upon12
evidence outside of the record to assure the jury of the
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credibility of a prosecution witness or the strength of the
Commonwealth’s case.  Rather, the prosecutor emphasized that
the jury’s decision must be based on the law and the evidence.
Although he informed jurors that he was specifically requesting
the death penalty for Kindler and not Shaw, he also stated that
the jury must make its own decision about what sentence was
appropriate for Kindler and his codefendant irrespective of the
Commonwealth’s position.  
Although it would have been far better for the prosecutor
to simply make his argument without informing the jury of the
official position of the District Attorney, his statements here are
distinguishable from those that have required relief in other
cases.  For example, in Shurn v. Delo, 177 F.3d 662 (8  Cir.th
1999), the prosecutor, after linking the defendant to notorious
mass murderer Charles Manson, and imploring the jury to kill
the defendant several times,  stated: “I’m the top law
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enforcement officer in this county and I’m the one that decides
in which cases to ask for the death penalty . . . .  I’m telling you
there’s no case that could be more obvious than the
[defendants’].”  177 F.3d at 666.  
Although we disagree with the District Court’s view of
Kindler’s vouching claim, we agree it comes perilously close to
the evils enunciated in Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383 (11  Cir.th
1985).  There, the prosecutor made an unsupported claim that he
had only sought the death penalty in a few cases during the past
year, which improperly implied “that the prosecutor’s office had
already made the careful judgment that [that] case, above most
other murder cases, warranted the death penalty.”  Id. at 1383.
The prosecutor’s statement here did not purport to draw upon
evidence outside the record in order to distinguish between
Kindler and his codefendant.  Cf. Giglio v. United States, 405
U.S. 150, 154 (1972).
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D.  Non-Statutory Aggravating Factors
Kindler also objected to the following portion of the
prosecutor’s argument during the penalty phase:  
There has been testimony that you heard that
Mister Shaw was in fact led.  You have heard
testimony from his grandmother, as a matter of
fact, that he in fact got into trouble because he
was led as a result of other people, because of the
failure perhaps at times to have sufficient male
companionship among other things.  If that were
the case and you must accept that does not lessen
in terms of guilt of a crime indeed not as you had
found.
But as you must consider in reverse what and
where that puts the individual that organized and
effectuated this particular act, for . . . that man has
not only forever ruined the life of an individual so
that he is dead but ruined the life of another
individual because of his influence, intensity,
clarity of purpose and methods in detail. . .  That
is what we are talking about.  
If you believed that Mister Shaw was in fact led,
if you believe that he, as a, at the time, 16 year old
boy, who was under the influence of older people
and if you believe that either indirectly or
whatever, there was a certain amount of coercion,
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although not sufficient to negate the crime, if you
would accept that, well yes, you could find of
course mitigating circumstances in that.  So you
must consider, however, ever there the
aggravating circumstances that I had mentioned.
That’s up to you to decide.  
But in reference to Mister Kindler, it’s an entirely
different story.  Because with that, we are talking
about, a leader, the actor, the one with the idea,
the one with the motive, the one with the push
throughout, the one that came back and said he’s
not dead yet; I had to use a concrete stone to drop
him in the river.  Ladies and gentlemen, that
alone.  We are talking about weighing, we are
talking weighing of circumstances to see where
the aggravating circumstances and the mitigating
would apply, how they in fact would be in
reference to weighing each other.
The district court concluded that this argument was
tantamount to asking the jury to impose the death penalty based
upon a “non-statutory” aggravating circumstance; that Kindler
was the leader who had organized the murder and in doing so
exerted undue influence over a vulnerable codefendant.  The
Commonwealth appeals.
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We agree that the prosecutor's argument was improper.
Neither Kindler's role in the murder, nor his influence over
Shaw can properly be considered an aggravating circumstance
under the applicable statute. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(d).
Rather than limit his argument to the aggravating factors defined
by the legislature, the prosecutor invited the jury to impose the
death penalty based upon his own view of the importance of
Kindler’s role and manipulation of Shaw.  The prosecutor's
argument introduced an invalid sentencing factor into the
analysis, which is an error of constitutional magnitude.  Cf.
Brown v. Sanders, 546 U.S. 212, 220 (2006).  
That said, this error did not have any "substantial and
injurious effect" on the deliberations.  Fry v. Pliler, 127 S.Ct.
2321, 2328 (2007).  At Kindler's sentencing, the jury found two
aggravating factors unrelated to the prosecutor's improper
     We assume for this inquiry that the jury’s findings were13
not affected by the Mills error or the ineffective assistance of
counsel.
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argument, and no mitigating factors.   The jury was instructed13
that "the verdict must be a sentence of death if the jury
unanimously finds at least one aggravating circumstance. . . and
no mitigating circumstances."  We presume that the jury
followed these instructions, and therefore we must conclude that
the jury would have sentenced Kindler to death whether or not
the improper argument was presented.  Richardson v. Marsh,
481 U.S. 200, 206 (1987) (stating the "almost invariable
assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions.").
The result of the equation would be the same whether the jury
weighed  2 aggravating circumstances against none or  3
aggravating circumstances to none. In either case, the absence
of any mitigating factors would tip the balance in favor of a
sentence of death.  Accordingly, the admission of the improper
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argument was harmless.
E.  Simmons v. California
Kindler also argues that the penalty phase was flawed
because the trial court did not inform the jury that “life” means
life in Pennsylvania and he would not be eligible for parole if
sentenced to life imprisonment. In Simmons v. South Carolina,
512 U.S. 154 (1994), the Court held that not informing a jury
that a defendant would never be released on parole if sentenced
to life was a violation of due process requiring a new penalty
phase.  However, that requirement is only applicable when the
prosecution argues future dangerousness.  the Court explained:
Holding all other factors constant, it is entirely
reasonable for a sentencing jury to view a
defendant who is eligible for parole as a greater
threat to society than a defendant who is not.
Indeed, there may be no greater assurance of a
defendant's future nondangerousness to the public
than the fact that he never will be released on
parole. The trial court's refusal to apprise the jury
of information so crucial to its sentencing
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determination, particularly when the prosecution
alluded to the defendant's future dangerousness in
its argument to the jury, cannot be reconciled with
our well-established precedents interpreting the
Due Process Clause.
512 U.S. 154, 164.  Kindler’s future dangerousness never
became an issue here. Therefore, the rule in Simmons simply
does not apply.
V.  Conclusion
To summarize: we conclude that the jury instructions
and verdict sheet that were used during the penalty phase of
Kindler’s trial denied him due process of law pursuant to the
holding in Mills v. Maryland.  We also find that Kindler was
denied effective assistance of counsel during the penalty
phase. However, we find no merit in the remainder of
Kindler’s claims.  
Accordingly, the order of the district court granting a
conditional writ of habeas corpus and ordering either a new
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sentencing hearing within 180 days or a sentence of life
imprisonment will be affirmed.
